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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
  Amici curiae are university professors or scholars 
holding senior positions at independent research institu-
tions. Each amicus has conducted or reviewed empirical 
research on juries, punitive damages, or both. The interest 
of the amici in this case is to provide the Court with an 
accurate summary of empirical research about jury behav-
ior and competence relating to punitive damages. Short 
biographies of each amicus are provided in Appendix A.1 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  Critics of punitive damages have argued that civil jury 
punitive awards are haphazard and based on biases 
against large corporations, that the frequency of awards 
has increased, and that the amounts awarded have in-
creased. They have also asserted that the ratio between 
punitive and compensatory damages is out of step with 
guidelines set by this Court, especially in cases involving 
very large punitive awards. Moreover, often implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly, critics argue that trial courts and 
appellate courts do not adequately exercise their powers to 
control inappropriate punitive awards.  
 
  1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37, amici state that blanket letters 
of consent from both parties have been filed with the Clerk of the Court, 
and pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for any party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity, other 
than amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution to its 
preparation and submission. Amici are grateful to Duke University 
School of Law students Brian D. Hurley, Jennifer L. McGinnis, Mat-
thew W. Wolfe, and Jennifer A. Zimbroff for their invaluable contribu-
tions to this brief. 
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  Over the last twenty-five years researchers from 
government organizations, universities and prestigious 
research institutions have conducted empirical research 
bearing on these various claims. The studies overwhelm-
ingly indicate that, contrary to the claims that these critics 
make, civil juries perform rationally and reasonably.  
  The research has found that: (1) juries award punitive 
damages infrequently; (2) punitive damages awards have 
not increased in frequency; (3) when adjustments are 
made for inflation the magnitude of such awards has not 
increased over the past several decades; (4) most awards 
are modest in size; (5) the overwhelming majority of 
awards show a rational proportionality between actual 
and potential harm caused by defendants; (6) the same 
proportionality relationship between compensatory and 
punitive damages exists in cases involving large punitive 
awards; (7) juries pay particular attention to the repre-
hensibility of defendants’ conduct; (8) jury decision-making 
processes in punitive damages cases are similar to the 
decision-making processes used by judges in bench trials 
of such cases; (9) the amounts of punitive awards rendered 
by juries and judges are similar when adjustments are 
made for case types; (10) little evidence indicates that 
juries are biased against large businesses; (11) judges 
effectively exercise supervision over punitive damages in 
post-verdict motions or on appeal; and (12) in other in-
stances post-verdict settlements reduce or abandon puni-
tive awards without judicial intervention.  
  These empirical findings strongly undermine the 
Petitioner’s premise that additional due process limits in 
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punitive damages cases are needed. Jury decision-making 
comports with the criteria that this Court has enunciated 
in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell2 and other 
leading cases. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. Juries Perform Rationally and According to 
Legal Principles When Assigning Punitive Dam-
ages. 
  This Court has outlined three criteria that should 
guide decision-making about punitive damages. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell states that “ ‘[T]he 
most important indicium of the reasonableness of punitive 
damages is the degree of reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct.’ ”3 Elaborating further, this Court said:  
We have instructed courts to determine the rep-
rehensibility of a defendant by considering 
whether: the harm caused was physical as op-
posed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced 
an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the 
health or safety of others; the target of the con-
duct had financial vulnerability; the conduct in-
volved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident; and the harm was the result of inten-
tional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere acci-
dent.4 
 
  2 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
  3 Id. at 420 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
575 (1996)). 
  4 Id.  
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  The second criterion is the relationship between 
compensatory and punitive damages. Although there can 
be “no bright-line ratio,” few awards exceeding a single 
digit ratio will satisfy due process.5 The third criterion 
involves the relationship between the punitive damages 
and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 
cases that might be subject to criminal penalties. This 
brief addresses only the first two criteria since the third 
criterion involves legal judgment beyond the purview of 
jury decisions. 
  Twenty-five years of empirical research lead to the 
conclusion that, with rare individual exceptions, jury 
behavior is consistent with this Court’s criteria. Punitive 
damages are rendered in only a small percentage of cases, 
mostly for intentional torts and fraud; the frequency and 
amounts of punitive damage awards have not changed 
over the past several decades; punitive to compensatory 
ratios are typically modest; juries and trial judges decide 
punitives using similar criteria, putting especial emphasis 
on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior.  
 
A. Juries Rarely Award Punitive Damages.  
  The “Civil Justice Survey of State Courts,” a joint 
project of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of 
Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts 
systematically collected data directly from clerks’ offices in 
 
  5 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426. See also Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (upholding a punitive damages award 
“more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages [and] more 
than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of” the plaintiff).  
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forty-six state courts of general jurisdiction covering three 
periods: 1991-92, 1996, and 2001.6 These data sets are 
representative of the seventy-five most populous counties 
in the United States. The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
findings lead to the estimate that punitive damages are 
awarded in less than one percent of all civil actions com-
menced during each of these three periods.7 In 2001 juries 
awarded punitive damages in only 5.7 percent of tort and 
contract cases when the plaintiff prevailed at trial.8 
  Eaton et al. recently reviewed a number of databases 
to conclude that “for every 1000 tort claims filed, typically 
only 50 or more are resolved by trial, only 25 produce trial 
 
  6 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts, 1992: Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large 
Counties, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report NCJ 154346 (July 
1995) [hereinafter “Bureau of Justice Statistics July 1995”]; Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts, 1996: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, NCJ 173426 (Sept. 1999) [herein-
after “Bureau of Justice Statistics September 1999”]; Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 
2001: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, NCJ 
202803 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter “Bureau of Justice Statistics April 
2004”]; Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts, 2001: Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 
2001, NCJ 206240 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter “Bureau of Justice Statistics 
November 2004”]; Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. Of Justice, 
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001: Punitive Damage Awards in 
Large Counties, 2001, NCJ 208445 (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter “Bureau of 
Justice Statistics March 2005”].  
  7 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive 
Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts 1992, 1996 and 2001 Data, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263, 268 
(2006) (“[A]pplying any realistic rate of filed cases reaching trial, less 
than 1 percent of civil actions formally commenced resulted in the 
awarding of punitive damages.”). 
  8 Bureau of Justice Statistics April 2004, supra note 7, at 3 tbl.2. 
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outcomes favorable to the plaintiff, and only 1.25 [of 1000] 
have a punitive damage award.”9 
  In 1998 Professor Michael Rustad reviewed nine 
major empirical studies of punitive damage awards con-
ducted up to that time.10 The combined data from these 
studies reached as far back as 1960 and covered most 
geographical areas of the United States. The various 
studies were conducted by the United States General 
Accounting Office (“GAO”),11 by prestigious, non-partisan 
research institutions (the American Bar Foundation;12 the 
RAND Institute of Civil Justice (“RAND”)),13 by Professor 
William Landes and Judge Richard Posner,14 and by 
 
  9 Thomas Eaton et al., The Effects of Seeking Punitive Damages on 
the Processing of Tort Claims, 34 J. Legal Stud. 344, 345 (2005). 
  10 Michael Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data 
and Further Inquiry, 1998 Wisc. L. Rev. 15, 17–19 (1998). 
  11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Product Liability Verdicts and 
Case Resolution in Five States, GAO/HRD-89-90, at 24, 29 (Sept. 1989) 
(Punitive damages were awarded in 23 of 305 cases decided in five 
states.) [hereinafter “GAO Report”]. 
  12 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Civil Juries and the Politics 
of Reform 214 (1995) (“[P]unitive damage award activity suggests . . . 
the need for . . . skepticism with regard to claims about the increasing 
frequency of such awards.”). 
  13 James S. Kakalik et al., Costs and Compensation Paid in 
Aviation Accident Litigation 27 (1988) (“[P]unitive damages were not 
paid on any of the 2,198 closed cases.”); Erik Moller, Trends in Civil 
Jury Verdicts Since 1985, 33 (1996) (“[P]unitive damages are awarded 
very rarely.”); Mark Peterson, Syam Sarma & Michael Shanley, 
Punitive Damages: Empirical Findings 10 (1987) (Fewer than seven 
punitive damages awards per year in Cook County and fewer than six 
in San Francisco from 1960–1984.). 
  14 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure 
of Tort Law, 304–07 (1987) (“[The] insignificance of punitive damages in 
our sample is evidence that they are not being routinely awarded.”). 
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university-based academics.15 Since that time additional 
studies have been conducted.16  
  Every one of the above studies of actual jury verdicts 
has concluded that punitive damages are rarely awarded. 
 
  15 Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Dam-
ages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623, 633–37 (1997) (summarizing studies on the 
decision to award punitive damages) [hereinafter “Eisenberg et al., 
Predictability”]; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive 
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 745 (2002) 
[hereinafter “Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, & Punitive Damages 
2002”]; Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution 
Revisited: An Empirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of 
Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16 Just. Sys. J. 21 (1993); 
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Dam-
ages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not 
“Moral Monsters,” 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 975, 981–92 (1995) (concluding 
that punitive damages are rarely awarded in medical malpractice 
cases) [hereinafter “Rustad & Koenig, Reconceptualizing”]. 
  16 For example, a 2000 Georgia study concluded that “punitive 
damages currently are not a significant factor in personal injury 
litigation in Georgia.” Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the 
Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 Ga. 
L. Rev. 1049, 1094 (2000). A Florida study found that frequency of 
punitive damages awards to be “strikingly low.” Neil Vidmar & Mary R. 
Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and in 
Reality, 38 Harv. J. Legis. 487, 487 (2001). See also Stephen Daniels & 
Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1, 31 (1990) (1,287 cases involved punitive awards out of the 
25,627 civil jury verdicts studied.); Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn 
Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 
Ohio St. L.J. 315, 388 (1999) (no punitive awards in medical malprac-
tice or products liability cases in a twelve-year period in Franklin 
County, Ohio); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American 
Jury 254 (1995) (two punitive awards in 1,300 North Carolina medical 
malpractice cases); Eisenberg et al., The Relation between Punitive and 
Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of 
Awards, in Civil Juries and Civil Justice: Psychological and Legal 
Perspectives (Brian Bornstein et al. eds., forthcoming 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/id=929565 (“Multiple studies establish that punitive 
damages are rarely awarded. . . .”) [hereinafter “Eisenberg et al. 2007”]. 
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These findings strongly indicate that juries are very 
selective in awarding punitive damages. 
 
B. The Incidence of Punitive Damages Has 
Not Increased. 
  The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics study 
showed that in 2001 plaintiffs received punitive damages 
in 5.6 percent of jury trials in which plaintiffs prevailed, 
compared to 6.1 percent in 1992. While this difference is 
not statistically significant, it is in a direction opposite to 
claims that punitive damages are increasing.17 In contract 
cases the percentage of punitive awards declined from 12.9 
percent in 1992 to 10.1 percent in 2001, a difference that is 
statistically significant.18 The number of punitive damage 
awards for $1 million or more was 13.9 percent in 2001 
versus 12.2 percent in 1992.19 The small increase in the 
percent of million dollar awards was not statistically 
significant.  
  Strikingly, Rustad’s review of earlier studies yielded a 
similar conclusion.20 His research indicated that, with the 
exception of asbestos cases, punitive damages were in 
decline beginning at the end of the 1970s.21  
  In a recently completed study Eisenberg, Hans, and 
Wells investigated the relationship between punitive and 
 
  17 Bureau of Justice Statistics March 2005, supra note 6, at 8 tbl.9. 
  18 Id. 
  19 Id. 
  20 Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product 
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Emprical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 
36–39 (1992). 
  21 Id. at 37–38. 
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compensatory damages by combining the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics data for 1992, 1995, and 2001 with data 
on large awards collected by Hersch and Viscusi and with 
data on large awards collected by the National Law 
Journal.22 Analyses showed no noticeable increase in 
either compensatory or punitive damages for any of the 
three sets of data.  
  In short, jury critics’ claim that punitive damages are 
on the increase is not supported by hard data. 
 
C. Punitive Damages Are Primarily Awarded in 
Cases Involving Intentional Torts and Fraud. 
  Empirical data consistently show that punitive 
damages are rare in product liability and medical mal-
practice cases. For example, the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics data show that in 2001, among the nation’s seventy-
five largest counties there were only three punitive dam-
age awards out of a total of seventy product liability cases 
in which plaintiffs prevailed (two of the three cases in-
volved asbestos) and fifteen awards out of 311 medical 
malpractice cases.23 These findings are consistent with 
other studies.24  
  Rustad’s review of empirical studies on punitive 
damage awards concluded that the biggest growth area for 
large punitive damages was not in personal injury, but in 
 
  22 Eisenberg et al. 2007, supra note 16. 
  23 Bureau of Justice Statistics April 2004, supra note 6, at 6 tbl.7. 
  24 E.g., Rustad & Koenig, Reconceptualizing, supra note 15. 
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business and contract litigation involving economic harm 
resulting from opportunistic business practices.25 
  Vidmar and Rose’s examination of punitive awards 
against businesses led them to conclude that: 
punitive damages against businesses all tended 
to involve allegations of either a knowing and ac-
tive disregard for the law – e.g. illegal toxic 
dumping, allowing minors to have alcohol, falsely 
reporting inspections – or misconduct by people 
in senior positions – e.g., a ship’s captain, a busi-
ness owner, corporate executives. In short, these 
cases rarely involved businesses engaging in 
commonly accepted practices or those having 
taken normal precautions for safety.26  
  The Bureau of Justice Statistics data indicate that in 
2001, punitive damages were most likely to be awarded in 
cases involving slander/libel, intentional torts and false 
arrest/imprisonment. In contract cases punitive damages 
were most likely to be awarded in partnership disputes, 
employment discrimination and fraud.27 
 
D. Punitive Damages Tend to Be Modest and 
To Be Positively Correlated with Compen-
satory Damages. 
  In BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore28 and State Farm Mut. 
Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell29 this Court, while reluctant to 
 
  25 Rustad, supra note 10, at 37–39. 
  26 Vidmar & Rose, supra note 16, at 499. 
  27 Bureau of Justice Statistics April 2004, supra note 6, at 5. These 
figures include both jury and bench trials. 
  28 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996). 
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establish concrete constitutional limits, suggested that the 
ratio between punitive damages and the actual harm and 
potential harm to the plaintiff or non-parties should 
ordinarily not exceed a single digit.  
  The empirical findings show the damages awarded by 
juries and upheld by courts are in line with this Court’s 
directives. The Bureau of Justice Statistics data for 2001 
show that the median inflation-adjusted punitive award 
when plaintiffs prevailed was only $50,000, compared with 
$63,000 in 1992.30  
  In a study covering nine states, Daniels and Martin 
found that, in fifteen of twenty counties that had more 
than ten punitive verdicts, the median punitive award was 
below $40,000.31 
  In a sample of Florida cases involving both personal 
injury and business disputes covering the years from 1989 
through 1998 Vidmar and Rose found that the median 
punitive award was only seventy percent of the compensa-
tory award.32 
  Rustad’s study of 355 product liability cases involving 
punitive damages over a twenty-five year period yielded a 
conclusion that the median ratio of punitive damages to 
 
  29 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410 
(2003). 
  30 Bureau of Justice Statistics March 2005, supra note 6, at 8 tbl.9. 
  31 Steven Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive 
Damages, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 41–42 (1990). 
  32 Vidmar & Rose, supra note 16, at 501 tbl.3. 
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compensatory damages awarded at trial was 1.67 to 1.33 
Compensatory damages were actually higher than puni-
tive damages in fully thirty-six percent of the cases.34 
Rustad further concluded that when the awards were 
adjusted for inflation there was “virtually no change in 
the size of verdicts.”35 Finally, the data showed that 
“[a]lthough the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages 
was admittedly higher in a small number of awards, the 
pattern was that punitives are proportionate to actual 
damages.”36 
  Eisenberg et al. analyzed a nationwide sample of 
punitive damage awards plus samples of cases from 
Illinois and California. Those authors found a strong and 
statistically significant correlation between compensatory 
damages and punitive awards.37 Similar correlations were 
found in the GAO study,38 the RAND study,39 and other 
studies.40 Additionally, Eisenberg et al. found no evidence 
 
  33 Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product 
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Emprical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 
50 (1992). 
  34 Id. at 1, 51. 
  35 Id. at 49. 
  36 Id. at 51. 
  37 Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 15, at 637–39, 647–52. 
  38 U.S. General Accounting Office, Product Liability Verdicts and 
Case Resolution in Five States, GAO/HRD-89-90 (Sept. 1989). 
  39 Erik Moller et al., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury 
Verdicts, 28 J. Legal Stud. 283, 300 n.52 (1997). 
  40 Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, On the Determinants and 
Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 527, 543 
(1999).  
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that punitive awards are more likely when individuals sue 
businesses than when individuals sue individuals.41 
  Eisenberg, Hans and Wells further investigated the 
relationship between punitive and compensatory damages 
in their combined data sets involving the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics data for 1992, 1995 and 2001, the data 
on large awards collected by Hersch and Viscusi, and the 
data on large awards collected by the National Law 
Journal.42 The data showed that large punitive awards are 
almost never given in cases with small compensatory 
awards. Further, the analyses demonstrated a strong, 
significant positive correlation between punitive and 
compensatory awards.  
 
E. “Blockbuster” Cases: Punitive Damages Also 
Correlate with Compensatory Damages. 
  While essentially conceding that, overall, punitive 
damages positively correlate with compensatory damages, 
a study by Hersch and Viscusi examined cases with 
punitive awards equaling or exceeding $100 million 
(“blockbuster awards”) and claimed to have found that 
“blockbuster awards are not correlated with compensatory 
damage awards.”43  
  Eisenberg and Wells challenged the Hersh and Viscusi 
conclusions by drawing attention to major flaws in their 
 
  41 Eisenberg supra note 37, at 639–40, 646. 
  42 Eisenberg et al. 2007, supra note 16. 
  43 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges 
and Juries Perform, 33 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2, 34 (2004). 
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statistical methodology.44 Using correct methodologies and 
appropriate statistical analyses, Eisenberg and Wells 
recalculated the data involving every known punitive 
award equal to or in excess of $100 million occurring 
between 1985 and 2003. They found a strong, statistically 
significant relationship between punitive and compensa-
tory awards: the larger the punitive award, the larger the 
compensatory award. Eisenberg and Wells thus demon-
strated that, contrary to the Hersch and Viscusi conclu-
sion, “Blockbuster punitive awards, like other punitive 
awards, show a strong association with compensatory 
awards.”45  
  The subsequent Eisenberg, Hans and Wells study also 
concluded that there was no evidence showing an increase 
over time in so-called blockbuster awards.46  
  In short, there is a positive, statistically reliable 
relationship between compensatory and punitive awards 
for cases involving very large punitive awards as well as 
the overwhelming bulk of cases with more modest ver-
dicts. 
 
F. Juries and Judges Use Similar Criteria in 
Deciding Punitive Damages. 
  One way to assess the responsibility and fairness of 
the punitive damage awards of juries is to compare jury 
awards to awards made by judges when cases are tried in 
 
  44 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin Wells, The Significant Association 
between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A 
Methodological Primer, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 175, 177–78 (2006). 
  45 Id. at 194. 
  46 Eisenberg et al. 2007, supra note 16. 
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bench trials. A recent study by Eisenberg et al. has done 
just that.47 Drawing upon the data collected by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics in 1992, 1995 and 2001 Eisenberg et 
al. compared awards made by juries with awards made by 
judges.48 There were 11,610 cases in the total sample and 
punitive awards were made in 539 cases with non-zero 
compensatory awards, 438 (81.3 percent) made by juries 
and 101 (18.7 percent) made by judges.49 The researchers 
examined (a) the relationship between compensatory 
damages and punitive damages and (b) the rates at which 
judges versus juries awarded damages. There is, of course, 
a problem of case selection: judges and juries hear differ-
ent types of cases. However, to the extent possible, these 
differences were taken into account in the analyses.  
  Statistical regression analyses indicated that juries 
and judges awarded about the same amount of punitive 
damages per dollar of compensatory damages. Eisenberg 
et al. concluded that there was “no substantial evidence 
that judges and juries behave differently in any meaning-
ful and systematic manner.”50  
  Eaton et al. studied over 25,000 civil cases filed in 
state and superior courts in Georgia.51 They concluded that 
 
  47 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judges, Juries and Punitive Damages: 
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 
1996 and 2001 Data, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263, 267 (2006). 
  48 Id. 
  49 Id. at 268. 
  50 Id. at 265. 
  51 Thomas Eaton et al., The Effects of Seeking Punitive Damages on 
the Processing of Tort Claims, 34 J. Legal Studies 343, 344 (2005). 
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“[a]fter controlling for other factors, juries in Georgia are 
not more likely than judges to award punitive damages.”52 
  A study by Robbennolt complements the Eisenberg 
and Eaton et al. findings while avoiding the problem of 
juries and judges deciding different cases.53 Robbennolt 
asked eighty-seven federal and state trial court judges and 
140 jury-eligible citizens to respond to a description of a 
lawsuit, which involved an injury resulting from an HMO 
policy prescribing a particular medication despite an 
internal memo indicating potential side effects. The 
outcome was described as either moderate or severe; the 
wealth of the HMO was also varied. Each participant was 
provided with one version of the incident and asked to 
recommend compensatory and punitive damages. Robben-
nolt found that the decision making of judges and citizens 
with regard to punitive damage awards was quite similar. 
The severity of the plaintiff ’s injury influenced compensa-
tory awards, but both actual and potential injury com-
bined to influence punitive damage awards among both 
judges and juries.54 When the defendant’s actions were 
perceived to be more offensive jurors and judges tended to 
award more punitive damages. Robbennolt concluded that 
the recommended punitive damages of juries and judges 
“were influenced by the same factors and were of similar 
magnitude.”55 
 
  52 Id. at 364. 
  53 Jennifer Robbennolt, Punitive Damage Decision Making: The 
Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges, 26 Law & Hum. Behav. 
315 (2002). 
  54 Id. at 320–33. 
  55 Id. at 336. 
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  In short, the decision-making of juries in awarding 
punitive damages was found to be similar to the decision-
making of trial judges. 
 
G. Other Research Supports and Complements 
the Findings Cited Above. 
  Experimental studies on punitive damages have found 
that the severity of the injury caused to the plaintiff, or 
the potential harm that the defendant’s actions may have 
caused or the reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior 
influenced punitive awards.56  
  Greene and her colleagues studied the decisions of 
jury-eligible citizens and students in a series of experi-
ments that used case scenarios involving personal injury, 
products liability, insurance bad faith, automobile negli-
gence and medical malpractice. The jurors tended to 
award greater damages when the defendants had acted in 
a reprehensible manner.57  
 
  56 For a general review of these studies, see generally Jennifer 
Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 Buffalo L. Rev. 103 (2002) and Edith 
Greene & Brian Bornstein, Determining Damages: The Psychology of 
Jury Awards (2003). An experiment by Corrine Cather et al., Plaintiff 
Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications for Compensatory 
and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 189, 201–02 
(1996), did not find an effect of severity on punitive damage awards, but 
the result may have been due to problems in the case materials 
presented to the participants. 
  57 Corrine Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehen-
sibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 
20 Law & Hum. Behav. 189, 201 (2005); Edith Greene et al., Compen-
sating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?, 
24 Law & Hum. Behav. 187, 196 (2000); Edith Greene et al., The Effects 
of Defendant Conduct on Jury Damage Awards, 86 J. Applied. Psychol. 
(Continued on following page) 
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  Kahneman et al. asked citizens to evaluate a series of 
personal injury claims and rate the outrageousness of the 
conduct, the appropriate level of punishment or to make a 
punitive damage award. Larger punitive damages were 
awarded when the injury was rated as more severe.58  
  Horowitz and Bordens conducted a complex simula-
tion experiment, finding that the earlier the defendants 
should have been aware of the harmful effects, the greater 
the award.59 In another experiment, those authors found 
that the amounts of the punitive award increased when 
the potential plaintiff population involved hundreds of 
potential victims.60  
  Some studies have found that the wealth of the 
defendant is correlated with the size of the punitive 
award.61 This should not be surprising, nor inappropriate. 
In 1869, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Goddard v. 
 
228, 235–36 (2001); Edith Greene et al., The Effects of Limiting 
Punitive Damage Awards, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 217, 225 (2001). See 
generally Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Determining Damages: The 
Psychology of Jury Awards 134 (2003) (describing the relationship 
between defendant’s conduct and the size of punitive awards). 
  58 Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass Sunstein, Shared 
Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 
J. Risk & Uncertainty 49, 62–64 (1998). 
  59 Irwin Horowitz & Kenneth Bordens, An Experimental Investiga-
tion of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 
269, 281 (1990). 
  60 Irwin Horowitz & Kenneth Bordens, The Effects of Outlier 
Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on 
Simulated Jury Decisions, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 209, 225–27 (1988). 
  61 See Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current 
Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 15, 42–48 (1998) (“Punitive 
damages are based on the wealth of the defendant in the vast majority 
of states. . . .”). 
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Grand Trunk Railway62 concluded that large punitive 
damages against a corporation served an “impressive 
lesson.”63  
  Despite the obvious logic of making the wealthy pay 
more to achieve commensurate punishment, research 
indicates that jurors take defendant wealth into account in 
a responsible way rather than in the irresponsible way 
that critics of juries often attribute to them.64 Hans con-
ducted systematic, in-depth interviews with jurors who 
had recently decided cases involving business corporation 
defendants and rendered punitive awards.65 The inter-
views revealed that juries took the wealth of the corpora-
tion into account, but they did not do so casually. Jurors 
viewed larger corporations as capable of paying more than 
smaller corporations, but at the same time did not want to 
excessively harm them financially. Hans concluded that 
“[j]urors’ remarks reflect concern about emptying a corpo-
rate defendant’s pockets, ruining a business through high 
awards. Other comments indicate that jurors in punitive 
damage cases consider the deterrent impact of an award.”66 
  The desire to punish reprehensible behavior commen-
surate with harm or potential harm appears to be the 
primary, indeed, the controlling motive, behind jury 
awards of punitive damages.  
 
 
  62 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, 57 Me. 202 (1869).  
  63 Id. at 228.  
  64 Some of these claims are reviewed in Valerie P. Hans, Business 
on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility 196–97 (2000). 
  65 Id. at 196–98. 
  66 Id. at 197–98. 
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H. Reprehensible Behavior Evokes Strong So-
cietal Condemnation. 
  The fact that punitive damages are most likely to be 
awarded in cases involving intentional torts and fraud, 
especially when the harm or potential harm is very serious 
or the defendant’s behavior is judged as reprehensible, 
should not be surprising. In 1893, Emile Durkheim, one of 
the fathers of modern sociology, observed that harms to an 
individual victim evoked strong reactions in communities 
because they violate widely shared societal norms about 
behavior, thus making everyone a victim.67 Galanter and 
Luban have argued that punitive damages primarily serve 
to emphasize the norms and important values implicit in 
laws proscribing fraud or other reprehensible behavior.68 
Sebok has shown that in the nineteenth-century the 
primary function of punitive damages was for punishment 
and vindication.69  
  Robbennolt, Darley, and MacCoun also drew attention 
to the retributive role that punitive damages play in 
restoring the values implicit in laws proscribing inten-
tional civil misconduct.70 Sunstein noted that laws have 
 
  67 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1893). See 
also Kai Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study of the Sociology of 
Deviance (1966) (studying the functional role of social deviance in 
seventeenth-century Massachusetts); Neil Vidmar, Retribution and 
Revenge, in Handbook of Justice Research in Law 31 (Joseph Sanders & 
V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).  
  68 Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages 
and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (1993). 
  69 Anthony Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunder-
standing the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 Chi-Kent 
L. Rev. 163, 205 (2003). 
  70 Jennifer Robbennolt, John Darley, & Robert MacCoun, Symbol-
ism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as 
(Continued on following page) 
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“expressive” functions that incorporate important social 
values.71 
  An experiment by Anderson and MacCoun presented 
simulating jurors with personal injury cases and the 
option of awarding the punitive damages to the individual 
plaintiff or to the state. Contrary to many people’s intui-
tions, the jurors were more likely to award the damages to 
the plaintiffs rather than the state, causing the authors to 
conclude that punitive damages serve a restorative func-
tion, advancing the breach caused by the defendant’s 
reprehensible actions.72  
 
I. Exxon-Funded Research Does Not Provide 
Credible Grounds For Concluding That Ju-
ries Are Incompetent. 
  A series of jury simulation studies funded by the 
Exxon Corporation in the wake of the punitive award 
 
Goal Managers, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 1121, 1142–44 (2003). Although 
arguing for treating punitive damages as a form of compensatory 
damages, Sharkey’s concept of punitive damages as “societal damages,” 
Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale 
L.J. 347, 393–99 (2003), has drawn attention to the fact that in many 
punitive damages cases the harm is not just to the individual plaintiff 
or plaintiffs in a law suit but also to persons who were harmed but were 
not part of the lawsuit (“absent plaintiffs”) but others who could 
potentially be harmed as a result of the violations of the law (“quasi-
plaintiffs”). Id. 
  71 Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 2021, 2024–25 (1996). 
  72 Michelle Anderson & Robert MacCoun, Conflict in Juror 
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 313, 327–28 (1999). 
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rendered for the Exxon Valdez Alaska oil spill,73 and 
eventually compiled in a book,74 led the authors to assert 
that jury decision-making with regard to punitive dam-
ages was unreliable, erratic and unpredictable.75  
  The broad conclusions of the Exxon-funded research-
ers have been severely critiqued in a number of articles by 
scholars who had no connection to the research.76 Punitive 
 
  73 Elizabeth Amon, Exxon Bankrolls Critics of Punitives, Then It 
Cites the Research in Appeal of $5.3 Billion Valdez Award, National 
Law Journal, May 17, 1999, at A1; Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to 
Suit the Need; In the 1990s, Exxon Began Paying for Research into 
Juries and the Damages They award; The Findings Have Served the 
Firm Well in Court, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 2003, at A1; William R. 
Freudenburg, Paper Abstract, The Intersection of Corporate Cash, 
Science and the Law: Toward a Closer Examination, Session on Law 
and Society: Legal Institutions and Processes, Annual Meeting of the 
American Sociological Association, Aug. 16, 2003. 
  74 Cass Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 
(2002). 
  75 Id. at 241. 
  76 See Neal Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 101, 242 (2002) (“[T]he data do not support the 
author’s critical view of punitive damages. . . .”); Steven Garber, 
Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency-Promoting Analysis: A 
Problem Without A Solution, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1809, 1817 (2000) (“The 
supporting argument and evidence [for abolishing punitive damages in 
product liability] are . . . far from compelling.”); Richard Lempert, 
Juries, Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a 
Social Science Case for Change, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 867, 870, 877 (1999) 
(“The [Exxon-funded] authors . . . do not make an adequate social 
science case for . . . change, and their recommendation that this should 
be done deserves no weight in any policy arena.”); Robert MacCoun, The 
Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations: Comment on 
Viscusi, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1821, 1827 (2000) (“Viscusi’s data on their own 
are clearly too modest to support his sweeping call to either remove 
punitive damages judgments from the jury or eliminate punitive 
damages altogether.”); Catherine Sharkey, Book Review, Punitive 
Damages: Should Jurors Decide?, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 382, 385 (2003) (“A 
fuller examination of Sunstein et al.’s empirical work reveals the 
(Continued on following page) 
23 
 
 
Damages essentially ignored or misstated real world 
findings that contradicted or were inconsistent with their 
own experimental findings, used experimental materials 
that were biased or required participants to make legal 
versus fact decisions and failed to adequately recognize 
the limitations of the experiments.  
  Although some of the experiments from Punitive 
Damages yield interesting and useful insights about juror 
decision-making, the studies do not provide a sufficient 
basis to make broad claims that juries are incompetent or 
erratic in awarding punitive damages.  
 
II. Judges Adequately Exercise Oversight Of 
Punitive Jury Awards and Post-Verdict Settle-
ments Often Reduce Awards. 
  As noted earlier, one of the arguments against puni-
tive damages is that trial courts are not using their powers 
to supervise jury verdicts. While there are instances in 
which juries arguably render verdicts that are excessive, 
 
indeterminacy—and possible inapplicability—of that research with 
respect to broader nonretributive theories of punitive damages. What 
this reveals, more generally, is the contingent nature of Sunstein et al.’s 
conclusions, and the implicit, and perhaps erroneous, assumptions that 
underlie their policy prescriptions.”); Neil Vidmar, Experimental 
Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error and Overreaching in 
Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 Emory L.J. 1359, 1403 (2004) 
(“[I]t is abundantly clear that Punitive Damages should not be treated 
as empirical authority for individual cases or for tort reform generally.”) 
Neil Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A 
Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 
705, 712 (1999) (“I am disturbed by the article, not only because of the 
legal errors, misstatements, and unsupported assertions that it 
contains, but by the authors’ attempt to draw largely unqualified policy 
implications.”). 
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research shows that judges frequently exercise remittitur 
or reverse verdicts. 
  Rustad has pointed out that individual states provide 
methods for reviewing the excessiveness of punitive 
damage awards.77 These standards include “passion or 
prejudice” and “shock the conscience” tests.78 
  The General Accounting Office study of product 
liability cases rendered between 1983 and 1985 in five 
states found post-trial reductions in eighty-two percent of 
punitive damages verdicts.79 
  A RAND study of awards in Cook County, Illinois and 
San Francisco, California concluded that for awards 
amounting to $1 million or more, reductions amounted to 
almost forty percent.80 
  Landes and Posner found that federal appellate courts 
reversed or remanded the majority of punitive awards, 
and in state trials, punitive damages were of “relative 
insignificance” in the area of products liability.  
  Viscusi reached a similar conclusion about products 
liability cases, finding that only twenty-nine percent of the 
 
  77 Michael Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 
Loy. La. L. Rev. 1297, 1329–34 (2005). 
  78 Id. 
  79 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chair, Subcommit-
tee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness, Commit-
tee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Product 
Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution in Five States, GAO/HRD-89-99, 
at 42 (1989). 
  80 Michael Shanley & Mark Peterson, Posttrial Adjustments to Jury 
Awards 29 (1987). 
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punitive award was paid.81 Of particular note, the “block-
buster” punitive awards studied by Hersch and Viscusi are 
regularly reduced.82 
  Empirical research further indicates that the damage 
awards are also reduced in post-verdict settlements 
without the need for judicial intervention. 
  Rustad examined the post-trial outcomes of punitive 
damages verdicts rendered between 1965 through 1990.83 
Almost forty percent of the cases were settled between the 
parties. Thirty-two percent were reduced or reversed by 
the trial judge or an appellate court. Twenty-five percent 
of cases were affirmed upon appeal.84 No punitive damages 
 
  81 W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 94 (1991). 
  82 E.g., IGEN Intern., Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 
303 (4th Cir. 2003) (reducing award of about $505 million by over 90 
percent); 50-Off Stores, Inc. v. Banques Paribas (Suisse), S.A., 180 F.3d 
247 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jury awarded in excess of $150 million in compen-
satory, consequential, and punitive damages; punitive award struck on 
appeal.); Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. American Financial 
Mortg. Corp., 855 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2004) (striking large jury award); COC 
Services, Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(striking large punitive damages award); Amoco Chemical Co. v. 
Certain Underwriter’s at Lloyd’s of London, 1996 WL 407855 (Cal. App.) 
(reversing large jury award). In MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 
987 F.Supp. 535 (S.D. Texas 1997), a jury awarded $220,720,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages. A retrial was ordered based on 
plaintiff discovery abuse, see Felicity Barringer, Judge Says Record 
Libel Case Should Be Retried, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1999, at C1, and it is 
reported that MMAR eventually chose not to pursue the case, David 
McHam, Law & the Media in Texas: Handbook for Journalists, avail-
able at http://www.texaspress.com/Lawpress/LawMedia/Libel/TexasLibel 
Cases.htm. 
  83 Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Product 
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 
1, 54–59 (1992). 
  84 Id. at 55. 
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were paid in forty-six percent of cases and some of the 
award was paid in fourteen percent of the cases. The full 
award was paid forty percent of the time.85 
  Rustad and Koenig found that in the relatively rare 
instances in which punitive damages were given in medi-
cal malpractice cases, in more than 40 percent of such 
cases the awards were reversed on appeal, settled or were 
not collectable due to defendant insolvency.86  
  Karpoff and Lott sampled almost two thousand cases 
involving claims for punitive damages that covered the 
broad spectrum from which punitive damage claims arise 
and found that post-verdict settlements were substantial.87 
The mean post-verdict punitive award settlement was 
never more than seventeen percent of the mean punitive 
award; in many types of cases punitive awards were never 
a factor in the settlements.88  
  Vidmar and Rose identified the twenty largest awards 
in their sample of Florida cases.89 They concluded that at 
least half of the awards resulted either in no payment or a 
reduced payment.  
  In summary, there is very strong evidence of judicial 
supervision of punitive awards. Post-verdict settlement 
negotiations are another common mechanism through which 
punitive damages are adjusted downward or not paid at all. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
  85 Id. at 56. 
  86 Rustad & Koenig, Reconceptualizing, supra note 15 at 1009–12. 
  87 Karpoff & Lott, supra note 40, at 527–30. 
  88 Id. at 537–38. 
  89 Vidmar & Rose, supra note 15, at 506. 
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CONCLUSION 
  Critics of punitive damages assert that juries are 
irresponsible, incompetent and biased in awarding dam-
ages and imply that trial and appellate courts do not 
adequately supervise or control punitive awards. Hard 
empirical data say otherwise on both issues.  
  American juries render punitive damages competently 
and responsibly and in a manner similar to decisions of 
experienced trial judges. Moreover, the data indicate that 
jury verdicts are rendered in accord with this Court’s 
concern in State Farm and earlier cases that the principal 
criterion for punitive damages should be the reprehensibil-
ity of the defendant’s behavior. Solid and extensive empiri-
cal facts should always trump anecdotes and innuendo. 
The empirical facts indicate that there is no need for this 
Court to impose additional federal constitutional due 
process standards on state punitive damages laws. 
  For the following reasons, the amici request that the 
decision below be affirmed. 
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